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Economic Impact of Political Barriers to Cross-Border Acquisitions:  An Empirical 
Study of CNOOC’s Unsuccessful Takeover of Unocal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In 2005, the US Congress challenged the acquisition by CNOOC (a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise) of Unocal (a US firm).  This challenge creates a political barrier for foreign companies 
to acquire US oil companies.  This paper examines the stock price reaction of US oil companies 
to this political opposition.  Using an event study methodology, we find that this political barrier 
resulted in a substantial decline in the market value of the US oil companies.  For a period of 44 
days, during which six anti-CNOOC-takeover political events occurred, the cumulative decline in 
the market value of a portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms was $47.5 billion and that of a portfolio 
of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms was $11.4 billion.  This study is the first to analyze and 
quantify the stock price reaction of US non-merging firms to political barriers to cross-border 
acquisitions.  It also has policy implication regarding the recent enactment of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007. 
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I.  Introduction 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of US firms have garnered 
substantial momentum over the last two decades. According to the World Investment 
Report 2008 published by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
the value of such activities had surged from $49.8 billion in 1987 to $379 billion in 2007.  
However, some recent attempts of foreign companies to acquire US firms have incited 
formidable political opposition.  Notable examples include Dubai’s Ports World’s bid to 
manage five US ports in 2006 and CNOOC’s offer to acquire Unocal in 2005. 
Moreover, the US government’s scrutiny of cross-border M&A has been 
tightened lately.  Specifically, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
(FINSA) was enacted by the US Congress and became effective on October 24, 2007.  
FINSA demands a more rigorous review on foreign investment in US companies, 
including cross-border M&A.  The scrutiny is particularly heightened for investment in 
certain sensitive sectors, e.g., energy industry and industries involving critical 
infrastructure and technologies.  Heightened scrutiny is also required for transactions 
involving an entity that is controlled by a foreign government.  As a case in point, 
although France is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should not 
pose military threats to the US, Alcatel’s (a French telecom company) acquisition of 
Lucent (a US telecom company) in 2006 was approved only with an exceptional 
stipulation—the US government could rescind the transaction in the future, should the 
combined entity ever breach security commitments made to the US government (‘A 
Higher Bar for Foreign Buyers’, Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2007).   
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We contend that political opposition to cross-border M&A can impact negatively 
on the market value of domestic firms in two aspects.  First, political barriers against 
foreign acquiring companies may lower the takeover probability, thus reducing the 
expected takeover premiums of domestic target firms.  Extant studies (e.g., Eun, Kolodny 
& Scheraga, 1996; and Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991) indicate that the share prices of 
target firms react favorably to announcements of cross-border M&A plans.  Obviously, 
creating obstacles for foreign acquirers can shrink the pool of potential bidders for 
domestic target firms.  Given an efficient capital market, the share prices of domestic 
firms may weaken, reflecting a lower probability of being cross-border M&A targets. 
Second, such barriers may deny potential gains derived from cross-border M&A.  
Marr, Mohta & Spivey (1993) have provided evidence suggesting that foreign bidders 
can enhance competition in the market for corporate control, while Eun, Kolodny & 
Scheraga (1996) have shown that cross-border takeovers may generate synergistic 
benefits by virtue of an increase in the combined shareholder wealth of the acquirer and 
the acquired. 
Hitherto, no research has examined and quantified the impact of political 
opposition to cross-border M&A on the economic value of domestic firms despite the 
importance of this issue.  As such, this paper is groundbreaking with an event study of 
CNOOC’s unsuccessful takeover of Unocal.  We intend to contribute to the debate on 
cross-border takeover policy by providing the first quantitative study of the impact of a 
cross-border M&A attempt that is thwarted primarily by political opposition. 
We choose to study the CNOOC case for three reasons.  First, this case is deemed 
a milestone because the US Congress has set a precedent that may discourage future 
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cross-border M&A in the oil industries and possibly other critical infrastructure 
industries.  Consistent with this claim, it appears that FINSA is in part a response to the 
public outcry over CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal in 2005.  Second, we choose 
the oil and gas industry because political barriers vary significantly across industries.  
Such barriers are particularly high in energy sector but low in sectors not involving 
critical infrastructure.  LaRussa, Raisner, and Wilner (2008) indicate that the US 
Congress was particularly concerned with foreign investment in the energy sector.  As a 
case in point, the US Congress did not oppose Haier (a Chinese stated-owned appliance-
manufacturing company) from attempting to acquire Maytag (its US counterpart) during 
the same time when CNOOC attempted to acquire Unocal.  Third, the rivalry between 
CNOOC and Chevron to woo the shareholders of Unocal was widely covered by the 
media and hence the events can readily be identified and chronicled. 
To quantify the impact of the CNOOC case, we examine the share price reaction 
of numerous US oil companies to the events pertaining to a political challenge against 
CNOOC’s proposal to acquire Unocal (hereinafter referred to as ‘anti-CNOOC-takeover 
events’).  Our sample firms comprise companies in the US oil refining and oil and gas 
exploration industries.  Using an event study methodology, we discover that the share 
prices of these firms suffered a significant setback in the wake of six anti-CNOOC-
takeover events.  While an equal-weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining companies 
(excluding Chevron) showed an average decline of nearly $7.9 billion in its market value 
per event, another equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration companies 
(excluding Unocal) registered a decline of some $1.9 billion on average per event.  In 
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sum, these two portfolios lost a total of nearly $59 billion in their market values, which 
exceeded the gross domestic product of Kuwait in 2005! 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we provide some 
background information about CNOOC, while a timeline of CNOOC’s attempted 
takeover of Unocal and the associated political opposition are given in Section III.  
Section IV describes our sample and data, and Section V the methodology of our study.  
We discuss the empirical results and robustness tests in Sections VI and VII, respectively.  
Our conclusion is set out in Section VIII, with some remarks on future research 
directions.  
  
II.  Institutional Details of CNOOC 
 
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited (referred to as ‘CNOOC’ 
throughout this paper) is an independent oil and gas exploration company operating 
primarily offshore from China and Indonesia. The company was incorporated in Hong 
Kong in 1999 and its shares are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Nevertheless, CNOOC is often considered as a de facto 
Chinese state-owned enterprise because approximately 70% of its total outstanding shares 
are in the hands of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, which is wholly owned 
by the People’s Republic of China.   
China’s demand for energy has been growing rapidly due to its brisk economic 
growth.  In 2003, China surpassed Japan to become the second largest consumer of 
petroleum in the world, behind the US.  The International Energy Agency (2005) 
reported that the oil consumption of China increased by 15% in 2004, breaching 6 million 
 7
barrels a day.  However, China’s domestic energy reserves are limited.  Its oil and gas 
reserves account for about 1% of the world’s total, compared with the US controlling 
roundly 2% and 3% of the world’s oil and gas reserves, respectively (‘Worldwide Look 
at Reserves and Production’ Oil and Gas Journal, December 20, 2004).  Coupled with a 
sustained increase in demand, such meager reserves have rendered China a net importer 
of oil since 1993, while the demand-supply imbalance is expected to worsen ahead.  The 
International Energy Agency (2004) estimates that by 2030, the daily shortfalls in the oil 
and gas supply in China will amount to 11 million barrels and 47 billion cubic meters, 
respectively.  Thus, it is understandable that Chinese oil companies are anxious to secure 
energy reserves worldwide.   
Being one of the flagship oil companies in China, CNOOC has been actively 
acquiring energy assets in foreign countries such as Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Myanmar and Nigeria (The major acquisitions made by CNOOC 
during 2002−2006 are set out in Appendix I).  While these acquisitions are small in size, 
they indicate that CNOOC’s interest in acquiring Unocal is in line with its expansion 
strategy.  
 
III.  Timeline of CNOOC’s Attempted Takeover of Unocal and the Associated 
Political Opposition 
 
Table 1 summarizes the timeline of CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal and 
the associated political opposition.  CNOOC was the first company to express an interest 
in acquiring Unocal, while private talks between the two companies commenced as early 
as December 2004.  On January 6, 2005, the Financial Times unveiled that CNOOC was 
considering offering approximately $13 billion to acquire Unocal.  Had this transaction 
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been completed, it would have represented the most significant and sizable cross-border 
acquisition made by a Chinese company.  
[Table 1 insert here] 
Afterwards, Chevron (a US oil company) and ENI (an Italian oil company) also 
expressed their interests in taking over Unocal on January 6 and January 12, respectively, 
resulting in a bidding war in the ensuing months.  On March 30 the Unocal board rejected 
ENI’s offer because it was inferior to those of its rivalries.  Although CNOOC was the 
leading bidder and its management team was interested in acquiring Unocal, the company 
did not make a formal offer to Unocal as its independent directors were concerned about 
the financial risks and political complications related to the merger (‘Fuel-Hungry 
CNOOC May Set Unocal Bid’, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2005).1  
In the absence of a formal offer from CNOOC, the Unocal board accepted 
Chevron’s bid on April 3.  Chevron offered Unocal’s shareholders a combination of stock 
and cash valued at approximately $16.5 billion in total.  However, CNOOC’s desire to 
acquire Unocal was apparently not extinguished.  Around two months after the Unocal 
board had accepted Chevron’s offer, CNOOC announced on June 7 that it was 
considering making a bid for Unocal by filing a formal statement with the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.  This announcement was widely covered by the US media the following 
day.  Two weeks later on June 22, CNOOC further announced that it would offer $67 per 
                                                 
1
 Coincidentally, an independent director of CNOOC resigned just a few days after Unocal had accepted 
Chevron’s offer for unspecified health reasons (‘CNOOC Independent Director Quits’, Financial Times, 
April 8, 2005). 
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share in cash for the shareholders of Unocal, valuing the company at approximately $18.5 
billion.  This unsolicited bid was again well publicized the next day.  
Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986), CNOOC’s 
interest in acquiring Unocal should not have been motivated by a stockpile of excess 
cash.  In the fiscal year ended 2003, CNOOC had $1.13 billion in free cash flow, 
translating to a mere 6.11% of its offer price for Unocal.2  To finance the acquisition, the 
company would have to borrow about $16 billion.  Two Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(i.e. the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation) would provide loans totaling $13 billion while the remaining $3 billion 
would be financed by two US investment banks (i.e. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan) 
(‘CNOOC Bid Raise Stakes in the Takeover of Unocal’, Oil and Gas Journal, June 27, 
2005). 
Meanwhile, industry experts anticipated that CNOOC would encounter tough 
political opposition for three major reasons.  For one thing, CNOOC was ultimately 
controlled by the Chinese government, a regime that was considered to be possibly 
posing threats to US national security.  In addition, some people considered that CNOOC 
had an ‘unfair’ funding advantage over its rival because it was subsidized indirectly by 
the Chinese government.  Specifically, the CNOOC acquisition was financed mainly by 
Chinese state-owned enterprises at a below-market interest rate.  For example, the 
weighted average cost of debt for the loans provided by its parent company was 2.25%, 
                                                 
2
 We follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) to compute the free cash flow of CNOOC. 
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which was substantially lower than the 7% charged by the two US investment banks.3  
Last but not the least, the merger of CNOOC and Unocal might have negative 
implications for vital energy supplies to the US. 
The above reasons were deployed by some politicians to oppose CNOOC’s bid 
for Unocal.  On June 20, two days before the announcement of this bid, two US 
Congressmen made a pre-emptive move and called for the Bush administration to review 
and potentially block CNOOC’s proposed acquisition (‘US Lawmakers Urge Review if 
CNOOC Makes Bid for Unocal’, Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2005).  In addition to 
national security concern, these two Congressmen argued that CNOOC’s offer was unfair 
because it had access to financing at a below-market interest rate.   
Subsequently, the anti-CNOOC takeover sentiment gathered momentum in the 
US Congress.  On June 27, five days after CNOOC had made its offer to Unocal, an open 
letter signed by 41 US Congressmen was circulating with a view to questioning the 
CNOOC-Unocal deal (‘CNOOC’s Unocal Bid Sheds Light on Revised Strategy’, Asian 
Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2005).  In the evening of June 30, the US House of 
Representatives passed a non-binding resolution (HR 344) by a vote of 398 to 15, 
expressing its concern that the CNOOC-Unocal deal could threaten US national security 
(‘In Order to Get Unocal, Timing May be the Key’, Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2005).4  
                                                 
3
 The parent company of CNOOC would provide two separate loans with the following terms:  (i) a $2.5 
billion interest-free bridging loan and (ii) a $4.5 billion 30-year loan at 3.5% (‘Irrational Fear Have No 
Place in Fight for Unocal’, South China Morning Post, June 25, 2005). 
4
 The national security concern was overblown by the Congress - Unocal was a relatively small US oil 
company with assets mainly in the Gulf of Mexico and Southeast Asia.  This was substantiated by a report 
from the US Energy Department a few months after CNOOC had withdrawn its bid, which concluded that 
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On the same day, the House also voted overwhelmingly to pass an amendment to an 
appropriations bill (H Amendment 431) that would bar the US Treasury from using its 
funds to ‘recommend approval’ of the CNOOC-Unocal merger deal.  In sum, there was 
concrete evidence showing that the US Congress had attempted to forestall CNOOC’s 
acquisition of Unocal. 
In the meantime, the executive branch of the US government offered no support 
to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal either, while the American public appeared to disapprove of 
the deal.  A pre-emptive review from the White House would benefit CNOOC’s 
acquisition of Unocal as the White House had the final say over approving the deal.  In 
addition, it could help eliminate the political uncertainty overhanging the deal.  
Nevertheless, on June 28, a White House spokesperson said that the US government 
would review the deal only if CNOOC’s bid was accepted by Unocal (‘US Seems Wary 
of Giving CNOOC Fast Review of Bid’, Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2005).  Thereafter, 
on July 14, a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll indicated that 73% of the 
respondents opposed the proposed acquisition (‘US Public is Hostile to CNOOC Bid’, 
Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2005). 
Furthermore, CNOOC suffered another setback when the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) declined to conduct a pre-emptive review of its 
offer to acquire Unocal.  Any foreign company that contemplates to acquire US assets is 
advised to file a voluntary notice of foreign acquisitions with the CFIUS, especially when 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘with one small exception unrelated to energy, there would have been no security risks’ associated with 
CNOOC’s takeover of Unocal (“China Oil Scramble ‘Does not Harm US’,” Financial Times, February 8, 
2006). 
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the acquisition could threaten US national security.5  A fast and favorable review from 
the CFIUS was critical because Unocal’s shareholders were scheduled to vote on the 
Chevron merger proposal on August 10, leaving CNOOC only 40 days to resolve the 
political uncertainty and convince Unocal’s shareholders to accept its bid instead.  On 
July 1, three days after the White House had declined to offer a pre-emptive review of the 
deal, CNOOC filed a notice with the CFIUS, requesting the committee to review its bid 
for Unocal.  However, the CFIUS rejected this request on July 13 and indicated that it 
would open an investigation only if Unocal scrapped its agreed deal with Chevron and 
finalized a deal with CNOOC (‘CNOOC Bid Review Is Dealt Setback’, Wall Street 
Journal, July 13, 2005). 
While CNOOC was running into roadblocks in its bid for Unocal, Chevron made 
a significant move to close its deal.  On July 19, Chevron increased its stock and cash 
offer to $63.01 per share to Unocal’s shareholders.  The total value of this offer at 
approximately $17.9 billion was $1.4 billion above the previous one but remained $0.6 
billion shy of CNOOC’s.  Given that CNOOC’s offer was beset with political 
uncertainty, Chevron’s move further reduced the likelihood of Unocal’s shareholders 
considering CNOOC’s proposal.   
Subsequently, the US Congress created two more hurdles for CNOOC.  On July 
20, 21 days before Unocal’s shareholders were scheduled to vote on Chevron’s offer, the 
                                                 
5
 Once a notice is filed, the CFIUS has 30 days to decide whether to investigate the case.  If it does decide 
to do so, it has an additional 45 days to make a recommendation.  Once a recommendation is made, the 
President has 15 days to act.  If a transaction is concluded without filing a notice with the CFIUS, the 
parties involved face the indefinite risk of divestment if the acquisition is later found to threaten US 
national security. 
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US Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill (HR 
3057), which would delay the US government’s approval of any acquisition of a US 
company by a foreign government-owned entity for 30 days.  This amendment required 
the US government to approve such acquisitions only after the Secretary of State’s 
delivery of an assessment as to whether there were reciprocal laws allowing for similar 
transactions in that foreign country (‘Global Ambitions of CNOOC Get Hemmed In’, 
Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2005).  On July 27, the US Congress further amended the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (HR 6) to require a 120-day review of China’s growing 
energy demands before any CNOOC-Unocal deal could be effected (‘CNOOC May Face 
A Fresh Obstacle in Bid for Unocal’, Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2005). 
On the whole, the vehement political opposition to CNOOC’s bid created 
considerable uncertainty for Unocal’s shareholders as to whether a deal would ultimately 
be approved by the US government.  With eight days left before Unocal’s shareholders 
were scheduled to vote on Chevron’s merger proposal, CNOOC withdrew its bid on 
August 2, citing ‘unprecedented political opposition’ as the reason.  
 
IV.  Sample and Data  
We search The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington 
Post between January 1, 2005 and August 15, 2005, to gather every news story about 
CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal.  As our aim is to examine the stock price 
reaction of US oil companies to the major political events, we identify an event date as 
the first trading day on which these companies could react to the news.  For example, in 
the evening of June 30, the House of Representatives passed a resolution (HR 344) and 
 14
an amendment (H Amendment 3058) to thwart CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal.  
However, as the US stock market was closed when this action occurred, we choose July 1 
as the event date, i.e. the first trading day after this action had occurred.  When we are 
unsure about when an event exactly took place, we crosscheck the event date by using 
company filings.     
Table 2 provides the detailed descriptions of three event groups.  ‘Anti-CNOOC-
takeover events’ refer to the political actions that opposed CNOOC’s acquisition of 
Unocal, while ‘CNOOC-takeover events’ refer to the announcements indicating 
CNOOC’s intention and decision to submit a formal merger offer to Unocal.  
‘Ambiguous events’ involve the concurrence of (i) a political action that opposed 
CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal and (ii) a CNOOC-initiated action that signaled a 
continuation of its bid for Unocal. 
[Table 2 insert here] 
We obtain our sample of US non-merging oil companies from the CRSP database. 
Our sample includes firms that are incorporated in the US and specializing in either the 
oil and gas exploration industry (excluding Chevron) or the oil refining industry 
(excluding Unocal).6,7  The final sample includes 66 US oil and gas exploration firms and 
13 US oil refining firms.  Appendix II lists the details of all the US non-merging oil firms 
used in this study.  We collect the security return data from the CRSP database and the 
                                                 
6
 To prevent any potential bias to our results, we exclude Chevron and Unocal in our sample.  While it is 
not shown here, our results remain the same even if they are included in the sample. 
7
 We use the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code to classify firms in their respective industries.  
The SIC codes for the oil and gas exploration industry and the oil refining industry are 1311 and 2911, 
respectively. 
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daily crude oil price data (i.e. the West Texas Intermediate crude spot price) from the US 
Energy Information Administration.8 
Table 2 above also shows the one- and three-day residual returns around the ten 
event dates for an equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms and an 
equal-weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms.9  This residual return is the actual 
stock return minus the predicted return based on a multifactor pricing model, to be 
described in Section V.   
 
V.  Methodology 
We employ the multivariate regression model which is commonly used in stock 
market studies of regulation (e.g., Binder, 1985; Bittlingmayer & Hazlett, 2000; Izan, 
1980; Schipper & Thompson, 1983; Smith, Bradley & Jarrell, 1986).  A multifactor 
pricing model is used because, in addition to the market return, crude oil return is also a 
key determinant of the stock returns of oil companies.  Using a portfolio of oil stocks 
from the Toronto Stock Exchange, Sadorsky (2001) finds that crude oil return is 
significantly correlated with the returns on oil stocks.  Specifically, he shows that the 
adjusted R-square increases from 0.04 to 0.22 when crude oil return is added as an 
explanatory variable in the market model.   
Meanwhile, to prevent any contemporaneous events from biasing our results, we 
include the stock returns of a control group in the multifactor pricing model.  The ideal 
                                                 
8
 The data on crude oil price are available for download at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcd.htm. 
9
 We also construct portfolios using value-weighted method, while it is not shown here, our results remain 
qualitatively similar to those using equal-weighted method.  
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control group should be influenced by contemporaneous events but unaffected by the 
anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  We use foreign oil and gas companies that are cross-listed 
on the major US stock exchanges (hereinafter referred to as ‘oil and gas ADRs’) as our 
control group.10  We expect that the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events would affect only 
the US oil companies, while contemporaneous events would affect both the US and 
foreign oil companies.  On the one hand, as the political opposition to CNOOC’s 
attempted takeover of Unocal raised the costs of foreign firms in acquiring US oil firms, 
the share prices of US oil companies should fall to reflect a contraction in their expected 
takeover premiums, while those of foreign oil companies should stay intact.  On the other 
hand, contemporaneous events such as geopolitical, oil, and macroeconomics shocks 
should affect both the US and foreign oil companies. 
We obtain our sample of oil and gas ADRs from the CRSP database.  Our control 
group includes 23 ADRs in the oil and gas exploration industry and 6 ADRs in the oil 
refining industry.  Appendix III lists the details of all the oil and gas ADRs used in this 
study.   
We apply the following multifactor pricing model: 
(1)  Rit = αi + βoiRot + βmiRmt + βfiRft + 1
, ,
1
i k k t
k
Dγ
+
=−
∑ + εit   
where Rit is the rate of return on an equal-weighted portfolio of industry i’s stocks 
on day t; mtR  is the rate of return on the CRSP equal-weighted market index on day t; Rot 
is the simple rate of return on crude oil on day t; and Rft is the rate of return on an equal-
weighted portfolio of ADRs that have the same SIC code as industry i on day t.  For anti-
                                                 
10
 An American Depository Receipts (ADR) represents ownership in the shares of a foreign company 
trading on US financial markets. 
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CNOOC-takeover or ambiguous events, Dk,t is a binary variable that takes the value of 
one during the three-day period (k = [−1,+1]) around a given event date t*, and zero 
otherwise.  The coefficients oiβ , miβ , and βfi are the oil beta, the market beta, and the 
foreign oil firm beta, respectively, for an equal-weighted portfolio of industry i’s stocks, 
while the γi,k coefficient estimates are the daily leading, coincident and lagging effects of 
the event for an equal-weighted portfolio of industry i’s stocks.  The cumulative residual 
returns of the event are computed by summing the coefficient estimates of γi,k from k days 
before to k days following the event date.  Throughout this paper, we report the 
cumulative residual returns over a three-day window (k=1).  We apply the multifactor 
pricing model by using daily returns between August 31, 2004 and December 9, 2005, 
i.e. 90 trading days prior to the day when CNOOC’s interest in acquiring Unocal was first 
revealed publicly to 90 trading days following the day when CNOOC withdrew its bid for 
Unocal.  
 
VI.  Empirical Results 
 
1.  Stock reactions of US non-merging oil firms to anti-CNOOC-takeover events 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the one- and three-day residual returns attributable to 
each of the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events for an equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil 
and gas exploration firms and an equal-weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms.  
The opposition from the two US Congressmen staged on June 20 was widely covered by 
the media and had significant industry-wide implications.  Specifically, the opposition 
sent a strong message to CNOOC, and possibly other Chinese and foreign companies, 
that the US Congress did not welcome them to acquire US oil companies.  Consistent 
with our expectations, the stocks of the US oil firms reacted negatively and significantly 
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to this event.  In the three-day period around this event, the market value of the oil 
refining portfolio declined by 2.3% (t = −9.73), while that of the oil and gas exploration 
portfolio declined by 1.6% (t = −10.41).   
Similarly, the stocks of the US oil companies also reacted unfavorably and 
significantly for each of the other anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  Over the three-day 
period surrounding the remaining five events, the market value of the oil refining 
portfolio dropped by a minimum of 0.8% (t = −3.21) to a maximum of 2.3% (t = −9.73) 
per event, while that of the oil and gas exploration portfolio fell by a minimum of 1.1% (t 
= −6.49) to a maximum of 2.1% (t = −11.76) per event.   The only exception was the US 
Senate opposition initiated on July 21, 2005.  On this day, the market value of the oil and 
gas exploration portfolio increased rather than decreased over the three-day period. 
  Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimates from Equation (1) of the six anti-
CNOOC-takeover events taken altogether.  Over the three-day period around the six anti-
CNOOC-takeover events (Panel A), the market value of the oil refining portfolio 
declined by an average of 1.5% (t = −2.76) per event, while that of the oil and gas 
exploration portfolio contracted by an average of 1% (t = −2.39) per event. 
The negative stock market reaction of the US oil stocks is consistent with our 
claim that the anti-CNOOC-takeover events had erected political barriers against foreign 
acquirers to purchase US oil companies.  Consequently, the stocks of US oil companies 
fell in anticipation of a lower future takeover probability and expected takeover premium.  
Nevertheless, it is also possible that the negative stock market reaction was in part due to 
an anticipation of future difficulties for US companies to enter the Chinese market, i.e. 
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economic reprisals.11  The economic reprisal argument appears to be shared by key US 
oil companies.  For example, Lee Raymond, the CEO of Exxon Mobil, said that it would 
be a “big mistake” for the US to block CNOOC from taking over Unocal (‘China’s 
Cnooc Lobs in Rival Bid to Acquire Unocal’, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2005).  
[Table 3 insert here] 
Figure 1A presents the average cumulative residual returns in a seven-day event 
window.  The cumulative residual returns of the oil and gas exploration portfolio dropped 
significantly on the day prior to the event (k = −1) and remained negative throughout the 
rest of the event window.    This compared with the cumulative residual returns of the oil 
refining portfolio, which decreased almost every day during the seven-day event window, 
with the largest drops occurring between two days prior to the event (k = −2) and one day 
after the event (k = +1).  The cumulative residual returns of the oil refining portfolio 
became negative on the day prior to the event (k = −1) and remained negative throughout 
the rest of the event window.  These results again indicate that the stocks of the US oil 
firms reacted unfavorably to the anti-CNOOC-takeover events. 
The total loss in the US oil industries was substantial and economically 
significant.  The two portfolios of 13 US oil refining firms and 66 US oil and gas 
exploration firms used in this study had an aggregate market capitalization of nearly $528 
billion and $190 billion, respectively, as of June 1, 2005, six days prior to CNOOC’s 
public acknowledgement of its intention to submit a formal bid to Unocal.  The 
respective cumulative three-day residual returns of −1.5% and −1% for the oil refining 
and the oil and gas exploration portfolios shown in Panel A of Table 3 translate to 
                                                 
11
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative hypothesis. 
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average losses of some $7.9 billion and $1.9 billion per anti-CNOOC-takeover event for 
these two portfolios correspondingly.   
For the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events, the aggregate cumulative decline in 
market value was above $47.5 billion for the oil refining portfolio and $11.4 billion for 
the oil and gas exploration portfolio.  Thus, the combined cumulative decline in the two 
portfolios amounted to nearly $59 billion, or approximately 8.2% of the total market 
capitalization of all the US oil companies used in this study. 
 
1.1 Cross-sectional Tests to Correct for Event-induced Variance 
Our multivariate regression methodology presumes that variance remains 
unchanged during the event period and that the reaction to the anti-CNOOC-takeover 
events is identical across firms.  Yet, these assumptions could be strong and bias our 
results.  To account for the possibility of an increase in variance during the event period 
and that the reaction to the anti-CNOOC-takeover events may not be identical across 
firms, we follow the suggestion by Mulherin (2007) and develop cross-sectional tests to 
examine the anti-CNOOC-takeover effects.  Cross-sectional tests are commonly used to 
correct for event-induced variance and allow reaction to the event to vary across firms.  
For example, as a robustness check, Mitchell and Netter (1989) use cross-sectional tests 
to examine the stock market reaction around the stock market crash of 1987.  
Specifically, they use a variance estimate based on cross-sectional returns during the 
event period (hereinafter referred to as ordinary cross-sectional tests) and nonparametric 
tests. 
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We follow Mitchell and Netter (1989) and use various cross-sectional tests to 
correct for increases in variance during the event period: (i) an ordinary cross-sectional 
test, (ii) double the variance estimated in the ordinary cross-sectional tests, (iii) a 
nonparametric test, and (iv) a standardized cross-sectional test.  We also include the 
standardized cross-sectional test because it is powerful in detecting the anti-CNOOC-
takeover effects especially when the average cumulative residual return is relatively 
small, as in our case.  Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) find that, in the presence 
of event-induced variance and when the average abnormal return is slightly different 
from zero, this test is more powerful than ordinary cross-sectional tests and sign tests in 
rejecting the null hypothesis.  Appendix IV provides a detailed description of these cross-
sectional tests. 
Panels A and B of Table 4 provide the average three-day cumulative residual 
returns (CAR) estimated based on these cross-sectional tests around each of the six anti-
CNOOC-takeover event of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms and 13 US oil refining 
firms, respectively.  Overall, our results remain qualitatively the same and hence are 
robust to the event-induced variance problem, if any.  Numerically, the average three-day 
cumulative residual returns based on these cross-sectional tests (Panels A and B, Table 4) 
are somewhat stronger (i.e. more negative) than those estimates based on the multivariate 
regression methodology (Panel A, Table 2).  Nevertheless, the t-values based on these 
cross-sectional tests are smaller in absolute magnitude than those estimates based on the 
multivariate regression model (Panel A, Table 2).  This indicates that the anti-CNOOC-
takeover events might have induced increases in variance during the event period. 
[Table 4 insert here] 
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Nonparametric tests are also used to account for the possibility of increased 
variance during the event period, including the increased variances arising from 
intertemporal and contemporaneous correlation of estimated residual returns.  Our results 
based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test (in double braces of Panels A and B, Table 4) 
remain qualitatively the same as those estimates based on the multivariate regression 
methodology (Panel A, Table 2).  More importantly, this nonparametric test also rejects 
the null hypothesis at the 1% level for all the anti-CNOOC-takeover event dates in both 
oil industries.  The only exception was the US Senate opposition initiated on July 21, 
2005.  On this day, the market value of the oil and gas exploration portfolio increased 
rather than decreased over the three-day period. 
Panels C&D of Table 4 provide the average one- and three-day cumulative 
residual returns estimated based on these cross-sectional tests when all the six anti-
CNOOC-takeover events are taken altogether.  Again, our results remain qualitatively the 
same and are robust to the event-induced variance problem.  Similarly, the average one- 
and three-day cumulative residual returns estimated based on these cross-sectional tests 
(Panels C&D, Table 4) are somewhat stronger (i.e. more negative) than those estimates 
based on the multivariate regression model (Panel A, Table 3).  Our nonparametric 
results indicate that the impact of the anti-CNOOC-takeover events is widespread.  For 
example, 56 (84.8%) of the 66 US oil and gas exploration firms and 13 (100%) of the 13 
US oil refining firms experienced a loss in market value over the three-day event period 
when all the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events are taken altogether.  In addition, all our 
nonparametric results reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level. 
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1.2 Plausibility of our results 
 The estimated 8% drop in industry value may seem excessive and implausible at 
first glance because not every firm in the oil industries is a potential takeover target.  
Nevertheless, we believe that our estimate is plausible because anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the takeover premium in the oil industries is significant.  For example, the 
takeover premium for Unocal offered by Chevron was 62.9%.12  Even for mega mergers 
of oil companies, their takeover premiums were sizable.  Table 5 presents the takeover 
premiums of three mega mergers in the oil industry during the merger wave of oil 
companies in 1998−1999.  Table 5 shows that the average takeover premium of merging 
Amoco and BP; Mobil and Exxon; and ARCO and BP-Amoco was 38.18%, with the 
aggregate takeover premium of above $39 billion. 
[Table 5 insert here] 
These takeover premiums are comparable to those estimated in the literature.  For 
example, Schwert (2000) examines 2,296 takeover contests for exchange-listed target 
companies during the period of 1975−1996 and finds that the mean takeover premium 
was 22%, while Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) analyze a total of 4,300 
completed M&A during the period of 1973−1998 and find that the median takeover 
premium was 37.9%, with the combined takeover premium amounting to approximately 
$38.7 billion.  As we measure the losses for all the US oil firms instead of a subset as in 
the previous studies, our finding of approximately $59 billion should be regarded as 
plausible. 
                                                 
12
 The actual takeover premium is computed based on the deal value as a percentage of the target’s market 
value four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal. 
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Moreover, the $59 billion estimated loss in the market value of the US oil 
companies would appear reasonable if the market had anticipated that a successful 
takeover of Unocal by CNOOC would trigger a merger wave in the oil industries.  The 
possibility of a merger wave is not far-fetched as Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that 
mergers are strongly clustered by industry and directly related to economic shocks.  One 
such economic shock was the sharp rise in the oil price since 2002.  The crude oil price 
increased by approximately three folds in 2002−2005.  In fact, Jensen (1986) suggests 
that similar shocks in the oil price had triggered the merger wave in the oil industries 
during the 1970s.  In the following Section, we examine whether the anti-CNOOC-
takeover events curb future cross-border M&A in the US oil industries. 
In addition, M&A have always been common in the oil industries.  Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) suggest that the oil industries were among the top five 
industries with respect to annual merger activities in the 1970s and 1980s.  Another 
example was the merger wave in the oil industries during 1998−1999, with the value of 
all completed deals reaching around $208 billion.13  If the average takeover premium was 
25%, the combined takeover premium in the US oil industries would be $52 billion (= 
0.25 x $208 billion), only $7 billion shy of our estimate on the loss in industry value.  
 
1.3  Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in the US Oil Industries 
In addition to the negative stock market reaction, we also expect the anti-
CNOOC-takeover events would discourage foreign acquirers from buying US oil 
companies.  To investigate this issue, we collect data on domestic and cross-border M&A 
                                                 
13
 We obtain the data on individual merger deals from the Transaction Roster in 1998 and 1999 of the 
Mergerstat Review.  
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of US oil companies (SIC=1311 and 2911) between the first quarter of 2000 (2000Q1) 
and the final quarter of 2007 (2007Q4) from the Thomson Financial SDC Database.  To 
ensure the M&A are large enough to warrant political scrutiny and oppositions, we 
exclude those whose takeover offer is smaller than US$10 million, the smallest market 
capitalization of our sample firms.   
Considering the possibility of confounding events that may bias our results, we 
include the US chemical industry (SIC=2800−2899) as our control group.  We choose the 
US chemical industry for three reasons.  First, crude oil is a major input that is common 
to oil and chemical industries.  Consequently, shocks in crude oil prices change input 
costs and could trigger consolidations and organizational changes in these industries.  
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) provide empirical evidence to support this claim.  They 
find that oil shocks increase M&A in not only the oil industry but also oil-dependent 
industries, e.g., the chemical industry.  Second, the US chemical industry is unaffected by 
the anti-CNOOC-takeover events because there was no such political opposition in this 
industry during our sample period.  Third, to prevent any country specific effect from 
biasing our results, we choose a control group in the US rather than that in a foreign 
country. 
Figures 2A and 2B present the cross-border ratio in the US oil and chemical 
industries.  This cross-border ratio is measured by either the number or the deal value of 
M&A.  Specifically, the cross-border ratio in Figure 2A (2B) is computed by dividing the 
number (deal value) of cross-border M&A by the aggregate number (deal value) of 
domestic and cross-border M&A during the quarter.  Contrary to our expectations, the 
cross-border ratio in the US oil industry had increased substantially since 2005Q2, the 
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quarter where the first anti-CNOOC-takeover event happened.  While it is not shown 
here, when the cross-border ratio is measured by the number (deal value) of M&A, it had 
increased by 0.07 (0.07) in the US oil industry since 2005Q2.  The increase is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
Nevertheless, the increase appears to be driven by the oil shock (i.e. the five-fold 
increase in crude oil prices in 2002−2007) rather than the anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  
We reason that, during the same period, the cross-border ratio had increased even more 
notably in the US chemical industry, an industry that had encountered no political 
opposition to cross-border M&A.  When the cross-border ratio in the chemical industry is 
measured by the number (deal value) of M&A, it had increased by approximately 0.14 
(0.40) since 2005Q2.  The increase is also statistically significant at the 1% level. 
To separate the oil shock effect from the political opposition effect, we apply the 
difference-in-difference methodology.  Specifically, we model the cross-border ratio as 
follows: 
1 2(1.4.1) ( ) 1 2i i i i i i it ty f T TIME D D Xα φ γ δ δ β ε′= + + + + + + , 
where ity  denotes the cross-border ratio in industry i during quarter t.  f(T) is a nonlinear 
time trend variable that is common to the US oil and chemical industries; it also captures 
time-varying macroeconomic factors that are missing in the regression model.  TIME is a 
linear time trend variable; D1 is a binary variable which measures the political opposition 
effect during the period when the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events were unfolding; D2 is 
a binary variable which measures the political opposition effect during the period after 
the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  D1 takes the value of one if the calendar quarter is 
either 2005Q2 or 2005Q3 and zero otherwise; D2 takes the value of one if the calendar 
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quarter is after 2005Q3 and zero otherwise; X is a vector of explanatory variables. As 
standard errors of time-series data are typically not iid, we follow Golbe and White 
(1988) and allow our standard errors to follow an autoregressive process.  Specifically, 
i
tε follows a third-order autoregressive process, namely 1 1 2 2 3 3
i i i i i i i i
t t t t tuε θ ε θ ε θ ε− − −= + + +  
and ( )2(0, )i it uu N σ .  The superscript i denotes industry i (i.e. the oil or chemical 
industry) and the subscript t denotes time in a quarterly interval. 
First, we subtract the equation for the US chemical industry from that for the US 
oil industry, rearrange terms, and obtain the following equation: 
1 2(1.4.2) 1 2D D D D D D Dt ty TIME D D Xα γ δ δ β ε′= + + + + +  
where D O Ct t ty y y= − ;
D O Cα α α= − ; D O Cγ γ γ= − ; 1 1 1D O Cδ δ δ= − ; 2 2 2D O Cδ δ δ= − ;
D O Cβ β β= − ; and D O Ct t tε ε ε= − . 
Our explanatory variables include changes in securities prices, currency exchange 
rates, and oil prices.  Extant studies (e.g., Weston, 1953; and Melicher, Ledolter, and 
D’Antonio, 1983) suggest that securities prices are positively correlated with a merger 
wave.  As such, the cross-border ratio should be positively correlated with securities 
prices in the world market relative to those in the US market.  We construct relative 
securities prices between the world and the US markets (WMKTt) by computing a simple 
average of the ratio of daily MSCI World Index (excluding US index) to daily MSCI US 
Index during quarter t.  The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market 
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capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance 
of developed markets other than the US.14  
International trade literature (Cushman, 1985; and Blonigen, 1997) indicates that 
the US dollar depreciation might have encouraged the inflow of foreign capital into the 
US during the 1980s.   As such, we expect that the strength of the US currency 
(EXRATE) to be negatively correlated with cross-border M&A.  Specifically, the cross-
border ratio should increase (decrease) when the US currency is weaker (stronger).  
EXRATEt is defined as a simple average of the daily weighted average of the foreign 
exchange value of the US dollar against a subset of the broad index currencies in quarter 
t.  The broad index currencies include the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden.15   
 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) provide empirical evidence to suggest that oil 
shocks and energy dependency drive takeover and restructuring activities.  Consequently, 
changes in crude oil prices affect cross-border M&A.  We argue that large oil shocks 
drive more cross-border M&A because the costs of acquiring foreign targets are larger 
than those of acquiring domestic targets.  For instance, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that 
the actual takeover premium for cross-border M&A is larger than that for domestic 
M&A.  Numerically, they find that the average takeover premium is 3% more for cross-
border M&A than for domestic M&A.  Cross-border M&A are less frequent when oil 
shocks are mild because the synergistic gains from cross-border M&A are deemed to be 
                                                 
14
 We obtain the daily MSCI World and US Indices from MSCI-Barra at 
http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/equity/performance.jsp. 
15
 We obtain the data on the strength of US dollar relative to a subset of the broad index currencies from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TWEXMMTH?cid=105. 
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small.  By the same token, cross-border M&A should be more prevalent when oil shocks 
are severe.  We use changes in crude oil prices as a proxy for the extent of oil shocks.  
OILPRIt is defined as the simple average of the daily price of the West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil during quarter t. 
 Table 6 presents the estimates of the OLS regression.  Consistent with our 
expectations, the anti-CNOOC-takeover events have appreciably reduced cross-border 
M&A in the US oil industry.  Relative to the US chemical industry, the cross-border ratio 
(as measured by the number of M&A) in the US oil industry had reduced by 37.5 
percentage points during the period when the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events were 
happening.   Similarly, relative to the control industry, the cross-border ratio (as 
measured by the number of M&A) in the US oil industry had reduced by 26.1 percentage 
points during the period after the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  These reductions in 
cross-border M&A are sizable and have economic significance.   
[Table 6 insert here] 
Our results are substantially stronger when the cross-border ratio is measured by 
the deal value of M&A.  These results imply that, since the first anti-CNOOC-takeover 
event, M&A in the US chemical industry had been dominated by numerous large cross-
border transactions.  Yet, during the same period, we witnessed no such domination in 
the US oil industry.  While it is not shown here, in the US chemical industry, only one 
(20%) of the top five M&A was a cross-border transaction prior to the anti-CNOOC-
takeover events.  Yet, this figure had increased by four-folds to four (i.e. 80%) out of the 
top five M&A since the first anti-CNOOC-takeover event occurred.  In contrast, in the 
US oil industry, none of the acquirers were foreigners in the top five M&A prior to the 
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anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  Nevertheless, this figure had increased to only one (20%) 
out of the top five M&A since the first anti-CNOOC-takeover event occurred.  In sum, 
our results imply that the anti-CNOOC-takeover events had discouraged foreign acquirers 
from buying oil companies in the US, particularly for large US oil companies. 
 
2.  Stock reactions of US non-merging oil firms to CNOOC-takeover events 
 
We also find that the stocks of the US oil firms reacted favorably when CNOOC 
announced its intention to submit a formal offer to Unocal, providing further evidence 
that cross-border acquisitions affect the market values of not only the participating firms 
but also the domestic non-merging firms in the same industry.  We deem it a clean test to 
examine the effect of cross-border M&A on the expected takeover premiums of non-
merging domestic firms given that this event was not anticipated by the market.  In 
addition, it was not confounded by any anti-CNOOC-takeover event as there was no 
identifiable political opposition prior to it. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the one- and three-day residual returns attributable to 
the two CNOOC-takeover events.  Consistent with our expectations, the stocks of the US 
oil companies reacted favorably to CNOOC’s publicized interest in acquiring Unocal.  
When the US media first reported CNOOC’s intention to submit a formal offer to Unocal 
on June 8, the market value of the oil refining portfolio increased by 0.7% (t = 2.77) 
while that of the oil and gas exploration portfolio increased by 1.6% (t = 12.67) over the 
three-day period.  Thus, our findings lend credence to the claim that rumors and 
announcements of cross-border acquisitions enhance the expected takeover premiums of 
non-merging domestic firms.   
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In a nutshell, the expected takeover premiums of non-merging domestic firms 
dwindle on the back of political opposition to cross-border acquisitions but expand in 
light of rumors and announcements of such M&A plans. 
 
3.  Ambiguous events 
 Panel C of Table 2 presents the one- and three-day residual returns attributable to 
two ambiguous events.  On an ambiguous event date, the stock market received two 
pieces of news which conveyed conflicting assessments regarding the likelihood of 
CNOOC’s success in acquiring Unocal:  (i) a political action that opposed CNOOC 
acquiring Unocal and (ii) a CNOOC-initiated action signaling that its bid for Unocal 
remained effective.  For example, on July 1, several US newspapers reported that the 
House of Representatives had voted overwhelmingly to express its concern about 
CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal, representing a political action to discourage 
CNOOC.  Despite such opposition, CNOOC demonstrated its strong determination to 
continue with the deal by filing a notice of foreign acquisitions with the CFIUS on the 
same day. 
The stocks of the US oil firms reacted differently to the two ambiguous events: 
unfavorably to the first (June 28) but indifferently to the second (July 1).  In response to 
the first ambiguous event, the market value of the oil refining portfolio declined by 0.6% 
(t = −1.91) while that of the oil and gas exploration portfolio declined by 0.5% (t = −3.37) 
over the three-day period.  In response to the second ambiguous event, the market value 
of the oil refining portfolio dropped slightly by 0.3% (t = −1.39) but that of the oil and 
gas exploration portfolio increased slightly by 0.2% (t = 1.24) over the three-day period.   
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 Panel B of Table 3 presents the estimates from Equation (1) of the two ambiguous 
events, taken altogether.  The stocks of the US oil firms remained unaffected in light of 
the ambiguous events.  None of the estimates for the three-day cumulative residual 
returns ( 1
,
1
i k
k
γ
+
=−
∑ ) is significant at the 5% level.  Contrary to our expectations, the share 
prices of the US oil firms reacted favorably but only mildly to the ambiguous events on 
the day following the events the market value of the oil refining portfolio increased by 
an average of 0.5% (t = 4.05) per event while that of the oil and gas exploration portfolio 
increased by an average of 1.2% (t = 18.95) per event.  
Figure 1B presents the cumulative residual returns of the ambiguous events in a 
seven-day event window, showing different patterns for the two portfolios.  The 
cumulative residual returns of the oil refining portfolio exhibited a mean-reverting pattern 
with the trend reversing its course every day.  For example, the cumulative residual 
returns of the oil refining portfolio decreased on the event day (k = 0) but increased on 
the following day (k = +1).  Meanwhile, the cumulative residual returns of the oil and gas 
exploration portfolio decreased on and prior to the event day (k = −1 or 0) but increased 
after the event day.   
 
VII.  Robustness Tests 
1. Alternative identification of events 
It is possible that we wrongly identify an event date because the identification of 
an event could be subjective.  To ensure the robustness of our main findings, we explore 
three alternative specifications of event dates.   
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First, it is possible that our results are transitory rather than permanent.  As such, 
we follow Ryngaert and Netter (1988) and examine a longer event window which covers 
the entire period when the anti-CNOOC-takeover events were unfolding.  Specifically, 
out of the 10 event dates, we select two well-defined events which mark the beginning 
and the end of the political opposition and examine the cumulative residual returns of the 
two portfolios over this period.  The two well-defined events are:  (i) the beginning - the 
opposition made by the two US Congressmen on June 20; and (ii) the end – CNOOC’s 
withdrawal of its bid for Unocal on August 2.   
 Figure 3 presents the cumulative residual returns between these two well-defined 
event dates.  The cumulative residual returns for the two portfolios turned negative on 
June 20 when the two Congressmen voiced their opposition and the returns remained 
negative until CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal on August 2.  The market value of the 
oil refining portfolio declined by a total of nearly 12.9% (t = −5.73) during the 44 days 
between the two events.  In economic terms, the oil refining portfolio lost nearly $68 
billion in market value during this 44-day period.  Similarly, the market value of the oil 
and gas exploration portfolio also declined but mildly by a total of 4.4% (t = −3.06), 
resulting in a total loss of approximately $8.4 billion between the two events.  Thus, our 
earlier conclusion that political barriers to cross-border takeovers have a significant 
negative economic impact on the US oil industry is validated and is not sensitive to 
mistakes, if any, in identifying the political events.   
 Second, we check the robustness of our results with respect to overlapping event 
windows.  There were two consecutive anti-CNOOC-takeover events on July 13 and 14.  
We exclude the latter and re-construct our analysis.  Panel A of Table 7 presents the 
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estimates from Equation (1) of the five anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  The results 
excluding the overlapping event are slightly stronger in size than our main findings and 
are economically significant.  Over the three-day period, the market value of the oil 
refining portfolio declined by an average of 1.9% (t = −2.45) per event while that of the 
oil and gas exploration portfolio declined by an average of 1.1% (t = −1.91) per event.  
Overall, our results remain qualitatively the same and hence are robust with respect to 
overlapping event windows. 
[Table 7 insert here] 
 Third, we check the robustness of our results with respect to possible mis-
classification of events, focusing on the ambiguous events in particular.  We treat them as 
anti-CNOOC-takeover events and re-construct our analysis.  Panel B of Table 7 presents 
the estimates from Equation (1) of the eight anti-CNOOC-takeover events (referred as 
‘expanded anti-CNOOC-takeover events’) after this re-classification.  Although the 
magnitude and statistical significance are slightly weaker when the ambiguous events are 
treated as anti-CNOOC-takeover events, our results remain qualitatively the same and 
economically significant.  In light of the eight anti-CNOOC-takeover events, the market 
value of the oil refining portfolio declined by an average of 1.1% (t = −2.16) per event 
while that of the oil and gas exploration portfolio decreased by an average of 0.6% (t = 
−1.79) per event over the three-day period. 
 Furthermore, to examine if our findings are driven by other contemporaneous 
events, we search The Wall Street Journal for news relevant to the oil industries other 
than the anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  With the exception of an energy bill passed by 
the US Senate on June 28, 2005, we find no major contemporaneous events during the 
 35
sample period.  This energy bill was expected to benefit rather than hurt the oil industries 
because it provided approximately $18 billion in tax breaks for the production of fossil 
and renewable fuels (‘Senate Approve Broad Energy Bill’, Washington Post, June 29, 
2005) and required electric utilities to source ten percent of their supplies from renewable 
resources by 2020.  However, on the same day, we also find an anti-CNOOC-takeover 
event as well as a CNOOC-takeover event.  In fact, we classify it as an ambiguous event 
date (Table 2, Panel C).  While the cumulative three-day residual returns were negative 
and statistically significant around this date (−0.49% for the oil & gas exploration 
portfolio and −0.61% for the oil refining portfolio), the magnitudes are relatively small 
compared to the market response to the anti-CNOOC-takeover events.  In short, the 
conclusions of this paper are robust with respect to mistakes, if any, in classifying events 
and excluding some contemporaneous events. 
 
2. Alternative methodology 
 It is possible that our estimates are biased because the portfolio returns on the oil 
and gas ADRs (Rft) are endogenous.  To resolve this issue, we adopt a different approach 
that does not include the portfolio returns on the oil and gas ADRs directly in the 
multifactor pricing model.  Instead, we compare the average returns of the US oil stocks 
with that of the oil and gas ADRs, each by a multifactor pricing model.  Specifically, we 
exclude the portfolio returns on the oil and gas ADRs from Equation (1) and run the 
following regression model for each firm during the sample period: 
(1′) Rit = αi + βoiRot + βmiRmt + εit   
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For each firm i, we obtain the coefficient estimates (i.e. iαˆ , oiβˆ and miβˆ ) from the 
regression and use them to compute the daily residual stock returns ( itεˆ ) on every trading 
day during the sample period.  Afterwards, we split the full sample into two groups by 
their SIC codes (oil refining vs. oil and gas exploration).  Next, for each industry group, 
we compute the differences in the average daily residual returns between the US oil 
stocks and foreign oil and gas ADRs ( tdεˆ ) on every trading day during the sample period 
as follows: 
(2′) 
,,
11
ˆˆ
ˆ
NM
jt Fit US
ji
td M N
εε
ε === −
∑∑
 
where 
,
ˆit USε denotes the abnormal return for the US oil stock i on day t and Fjt ,εˆ  for that 
of the foreign oil stock j on day t; and M and N are the number of US and foreign oil 
stocks, respectively, in the industry (oil refining or oil and gas exploration) under 
examination.  In the end, we regress the differences in the average daily residual returns 
( tdεˆ ) on three event dummy variables as follows:  
(3′) 1
,
1
ˆt k k t t
k
d D vε α γ
+
=−
= + +∑   
where vt is the random error on day t.  Note that for any contemporaneous events which 
may have a similar impact on the US and foreign oil stocks, tdεˆ will likely be close to 
zero on the event date.  Similarly, for events that have an impact on only the US stocks, 
tdεˆ will likely be different from zero on the event date. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the estimates from Equation (3′) of the six anti-
CNOOC-takeover events taken altogether for the oil and gas exploration industry and the 
 37
oil refining industry.  The results in Panel A are quantitatively and qualitatively identical 
to our main findings.  The shares of the US oil firms reacted unfavorably to the political 
opposition.  Over the three-day periods around the anti-CNOOC-takeover events, the 
market value of the US oil refining portfolio declined by an average of 1.4% (t = −2.46) 
more per event than that of the foreign oil refining portfolio.  Similarly, the market value 
of the US oil and gas exploration portfolio declined by an average of 1% (t = −2.91) more 
per event than that of the foreign oil and gas exploration portfolio. 
[Table 6 insert here] 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the estimates from Equation (3′) of the two 
ambiguous events taken altogether for the oil and gas exploration industry and the oil 
refining industry.  The results in Panel B are also quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
to our main findings.  Therefore, our findings and conclusions are robust with respect to 
the possibility of containing endogenous variables. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Our empirical results provide convincing evidence that political animosity 
towards cross-border M&A could adversely affect the market values of domestic non-
merging companies by lowering the expected takeover premiums facing these companies.  
In the case of CNOOC’s aborted takeover of Unocal, the US oil and gas firms under our 
study lost nearly $59 billion in market value in the wake of the political opposition to the 
deal.  While such opposition had substantially raised the costs for CNOOC in acquiring 
Unocal, it did not stifle the company’s enthusiasm for pursuing other energy supplies 
worldwide.  CNOOC has since signed several deals with companies and governments 
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outside the US (e.g., Australia, Canada, and Nigeria) with an aggregate value in excess of 
$2.3 billion.  In addition, the political opposition against CNOOC’s attempted takeover of 
Unocal has discouraged cross-border M&A in the US oil and gas industry.  Our findings 
indicate that, relative to the benchmark industry, cross-border M&A have dropped 
appreciably in the US oil and gas industry since the US Congress challenged CNOOC 
from attempting to take over Unocal.   
Our study is timely and has policy implication regarding the recent ratification of 
FINSA.  FINSA signals an increase in political animosity towards foreign investment in 
the US.  Specifically, FINSA creates additional uncertainty for foreign acquirers as to 
whether cross-border M&A would be approved by the US government.  Therefore, 
FINSA is a de facto political barrier to discourage cross-border M&A, particularly for 
those in the energy industry and industries involving critical infrastructure and 
technologies.  More importantly, our findings indicate that this political barrier could 
harm US firms.  This is because the share prices of US firms may weaken, reflecting a 
lower probability of being taken over by foreign acquirers.   
Given the growing importance of cross-border M&A, we believe the economic 
impact of FINSA on the performances and economic values of domestic non-merging 
companies is a promising area of research.  To the best of our knowledge, such research 
is seriously lacking.  More importantly, we believe that the answers to these questions 
will help a government shape its national policy for cross-border M&A and therefore are 
worthy of future investigation. 
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TABLE 1.  Deal timeline 
 
This table summarizes the timeline covering CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal.  
Events before June 22, 2005 are derived mostly from the ‘Background of the Merger’ 
section of the proxy statement of Unocal in 2005.  Events at later dates are derived from 
various newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and New York 
Times.  
 
Date Event 
Dec-
2004 
The CEO of CNOOC approached the CEO of Unocal expressing CNOOC’s potential interest 
to acquire Unocal.  Executives of the two companies discussed this matter secretly and 
generally during the following weeks. 
6-Jan-
2005 
The Financial Times published a report indicating that CNOOC was considering a bid of 
more than $13 billion for Unocal.  That same day, the CEO of Chevron contacted Unocal to 
inquire the possibility of enter a ‘strategic transaction’ with Unocal.  The CEO of Unocal 
indicated that Unocal was not soliciting a sale. 
12-Jan A senior executive of Italy’s ENI SPA (hereinafter referred to as ENI) contacted the CEO of 
Unocal and expressed its company interest to acquire Unocal if Unocal were to consider 
entertaining takeover offers from other companies. 
26-Feb Chevron made an all-stock offer to Unocal with an exchange ratio of 0.94 share of Chevron 
common stock per share of Unocal common stock.  
30-Mar ENI orally made a conditional cash offer of $58/share.  The Unocal board rejected ENI’s 
offer, requested CNOOC to submit a definitive offer by April 2, and told the CEO of Unocal 
to keep talking with Chevron and seek a partial cash deal. 
2-Apr CNOOC told Unocal it was not prepared to make an offer yet, but would consider future 
discussions.  Chevron board authorized a cash-and-stock deal at approximately $65/share. 
3-Apr Unocal board accepted Chevron offer. 
1-Jun CNOOC contacted Unocal and expressed its intention to present an offer to Unocal in the next 
few days.  That same day, Unocal notified Chevron about CNOOC’s potential bid.  
8-Jun CNOOC said it was considering a potential bid for Unocal in a statement filed with the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange the day before.  The news was widely reported by US-based media on 
June 8. 
10-Jun Federal Trade Commission accepted Chevron’s acquisition of Unocal, pending public 
comment. 
20-Jun Two US Congressmen, Duncan Hunter and Richard Pombo, were calling on the Bush 
administration to review – and potentially block – CNOOC’s attempt to take over Unocal. 
22-Jun CNOOC made an unsolicited $18.5 billion cash bid for Unocal, offering $67 a share.  In 
addition, CNOOC would have to pay a $500 million breakup fee to Chevron while assuming 
$1.6 billion of Unocal debt. The news was publicly reported on June 23, the day after. 
23-Jun Chevron granted Unocal a waiver to discuss the offer with CNOOC.  Negotiations began. 
27-Jun An open letter questioning CNOOC’s attempt to takeover Unocal, signed by 41 members of 
Congress, was already circulating. 
28-Jun The White House said the US would review CNOOC’s proposed takeover of Unocal only if 
its bid was accepted.  On the same day, some members of Congress and CNOOC suggested 
that CFIUS could stage a review even before CNOOC’s bid was accepted by Unocal. 
30-Jun In the evening of the same day, the House of Representatives first voted by 333 to 92 to bar 
the Treasury from using any of its funds to ‘recommend approval’ of the sale to CNOOC (HR 
344).  A second and nonbinding resolution, adopted by 398 to 15, expressed concern that the 
sale ‘would threaten to impair’ US national security (H Amendment 431). 
1-Jul CNOOC filed a voluntary notice of foreign acquisitions with the CFIUS. 
13-Jul CFIUS declined to review the potential CNOOC-Unocal deal and told CNOOC that a review 
would only commence after a definitive merger agreement had been reached. 
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14-Jul Unocal told CNOOC that the Unocal board might accept CNOOC’s offer if it put forward a 
price high enough to compensate for ‘additional risks’.  On the same day, a Wall Street 
Journal and NBC News poll found that 73% of the respondents opposed CNOOC’s attempted 
takeover of Unocal.  
19-Jul Chevron and Unocal jointly announced an amended merger agreement.  The revised 
transaction was structured as 40 percent cash and 60 percent stock, providing an overall value 
of $63.01 per share of Unocal common stock based on the closing price of Chevron stock on 
July 19, 2005.  Unocal stockholders could choose to receive, for each share of Unocal stock, 
either $69 in cash, 1.03 shares of Chevron stock, or a combination of $27.60 in cash and 
0.618 of a share of Chevron common stock, with the all-cash and all-stock elections subject to 
pro-ration. 
20-Jul Senator Charles Schumer of New York introduced an amendment to the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill (HR 3057), which the Senate passed by voice vote.  The amendment 
would delay the US government from approving any acquisition by a foreign government-
owned entity of a US company for 30 days.  The amendment requires the Secretary of State to 
deliver an assessment as to whether there were reciprocal laws allowing for similar 
transactions in that foreign country. 
27-Jul The US Congress added wording to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (HR 6) that would delay 
the closing of CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal for 120 days. 
2-Aug CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal, citing ‘unprecedented political opposition’, even though 
CNOOC could have raised its bid for Unocal, should CFIUS approved the CNOOC-Unocal 
takeover deal. 
10-Aug Unocal shareholders approved the merger proposal with Chevron. 
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TABLE 2.  Key event dates 
This table provides detailed descriptions of the six anti-CNOOC-takeover, two CNOOC-takeover, and two 
ambiguous events used in this study.  It also includes the one-day and three-day residual returns around the 
event dates of an equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal) and 
an equal-weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms (excluding Chevron). Anti-CNOOC-takeover 
events are the political actions that opposed CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal.  CNOOC-takeover events are 
the announcements indicating CNOOC’s intention and decision to submit a formal merger offer to Unocal.  
Ambiguous events involve the concurrence of (i) a political action that opposed CNOOC’s acquisition of 
Unocal and (ii) a CNOOC-initiated action that signaled a continuation of its bid for Unocal.  Denote Dk,t the 
binary variable that takes one during the three-day period around a given event date, t*, and zero otherwise.  
For each of the event dates (i.e., t*), the 3-day cumulative residual returns are computed by summing the 
coefficients γi,k of industry i over k = [−1,+1] by using the multifactor pricing model: 
1
, ,
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Statistical significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) and 10% (‘*’) levels, based on the robust 
standard errors. 
 
 
Panel A. Anti-CNOOC-takeover events 
Date 
Cumulative residual returns 
(1-day and 3-day) Description 
 
Oil & Gas 
Exploration Oil Refining 
 
6/20/05   -0.001 
  -0.016*** 
 0.003*** 
-0.023*** 
Two US Congressmen called on the Bush administration to review – and 
potentially block – CNOOC’s attempt to take over Unocal. 
 
6/27/05 -0.007*** 
-0.018*** 
 0.007*** 
-0.018*** 
An open letter questioning the CNOOC-Unocal merger deal signed by 41 
members of Congress was already circulating. 
 
7/13/05 -0.009*** 
-0.017*** 
-0.005*** 
-0.020*** 
CFIUS declined CNOOC’s request to perform a review of the CNOOC-
Unocal deal. 
 
7/14/05 -0.011*** 
-0.021*** 
-0.008*** 
-0.016*** 
In a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll, 73% of the respondents 
opposed CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal. 
 
7/21/05 0.000*** 
0.009*** 
-0.019*** 
-0.008*** 
US Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill (HR 3057) that would delay the closing of the 
CNOOC-Unocal deal for 30 days. 
 
7/27/05 -0.010*** 
-0.011*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.019*** 
The US Congress added wording to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (HR 
6) that would delay the closing of the CNOOC-Unocal deal for 120 days. 
 
 
 44
 
Panel B. CNOOC-takeover events 
Date 
Cumulative residual returns 
(1-day and 3-day) Description 
 
Oil & Gas 
Exploration Oil Refining 
 
6/8/05 0.014*** 
0.016*** 
0.005*** 
0.007*** 
The US-based media widely reported that CNOOC was considering a 
formal merger offer for Unocal, in a potential challenge to Chevron’s 
offer to Unocal. 
 
6/23/05  0.004*** 
-0.008*** 
0.001 
0.007** 
CNOOC made an unsolicited $18.5 billion cash bid for Unocal. 
 
 
 
Panel C. Ambiguous events 
Date 
Cumulative residual returns 
(1-day and 3-day) Description 
 
Oil & Gas 
Exploration Oil Refining 
 
6/28/05 -0.011*** 
-0.005*** 
-0.018*** 
-0.006* 
Anti-CNOOC-takeover news:  the White House said the US would 
review CNOOC’s proposed takeover of Unocal only if its bid was 
accepted by Unocal. 
 
Pro-CNOOC-takeover event:  CNOOC and some members of the US 
Congress suggested that CFIUS could stage a review even before 
CNOOC’s bid was accepted by Unocal. 
 
7/1/05  0.000 
0.002 
-0.001 
-0.003 
Anti-CNOOC-takeover news:  the US House of Representatives first 
voted 333-92 to bar the Treasury from using any of its funds to 
‘recommend approval’ of the sale to CNOOC (H Amendment 431).  A 
second and nonbinding resolution, adopted 398-15, expressed concern 
that the sale ‘would threaten or impair’ the US national security (HR 
344). 
 
Pro-CNOOC-takeover news:  CNOOC filed a notice of foreign 
acquisitions with CFIUS. 
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TABLE 3.  Regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the multifactor pricing model over the three-day window (day −1 
to day +1) for the two types of takeover events:  (i) Anti-CNOOC-takeover and (ii) ambiguous events of an 
equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal) and an equal-weighted 
portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms (excluding Chevron).  Denote Dk,t the binary variable that takes one 
during the three-day period around a given event date, t*, and zero otherwise.  For each of the event dates 
(i.e., t*), the 3-day cumulative residual returns are computed by summing the coefficients γi,k of industry i 
over k = [−1,+1] by using the multifactor pricing model: 
1
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The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses, based on the robust standard errors.  Statistical 
significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) and 10% (‘*’) levels. 
 
Panel A.  Anti-CNOOC-takeover events 
 αi βo βm βf γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration 
industry 0.000 0.092*** 0.448*** 0.809*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.010** 0.815 
 (0.781) (4.843) (5.496) (16.072) (-0.085) (-4.217) (-0.095) (-2.389)  
          
Oil refining industry 0.001 0.154*** 0.732*** 0.737*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.015*** 0.588 
 (1.476) (3.156) (5.242) (8.350) (-4.645) (-1.007) (-1.079) (-2.757)  
          
          
 
Panel B.  Ambiguous events 
 αi βo βm βf γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration 
industry 0.000 0.099*** 0.479*** 0.800*** -0.003 -0.005 0.012*** 0.004 0.809 
 (0.200) (5.265) (5.936) (16.899) (-0.912) (-1.365) (18.950) (0.895)  
          
Oil refining industry 0.001 0.156*** 0.726*** 0.749*** 0.002 -0.009 0.005*** -0.002 0.582 
 (0.991) (3.141) (5.141) (8.371) (0.704) (-1.496) (4.052) (-0.235)  
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TABLE 4.  Cross-Sectional Tests to Correct for Event-induced Variance 
 
Panels A and B provide the average three-day cumulative residual return (CAR) around each of the six 
anti-CNOOC-takeover events of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal) and of 13 US oil 
refining firms (excluding Chevron), respectively.  Panel C (Panel D) provides the average one-day (three-
day) CAR of the six anti-CNOOC-takeover events taken altogether for 66 US oil and gas exploration firms 
and 13 US oil refining firms.  Anti-CNOOC-takeover events are the political actions that opposed 
CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal.  T-statistics based on the ordinary cross-sectional test are in parentheses; 
t-statistics based on doubling the variance estimated in the ordinary cross-sectional test are in braces; t-
statistics based on the standardized cross-sectional test are in brackets; and p-values based on the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test of percent of firms with negative three-day CAR are in double 
braces.   
 
Statistical significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) and 10% (‘*’) levels. 
 
Panel A. Anti-CNOOC-takeover events for Oil and Gas Exploration Firms 
 6/20/05 6/27/05 7/13/05 7/14/05 7/21/05 7/27/05 
Average 
three-day 
CAR 
   -0.019 
(-2.75)*** 
  {-1.94}* 
[-4.35]*** 
    -0.021 
(-3.48)*** 
  {-2.46}** 
[-4.78]*** 
    -0.020 
(-4.41)*** 
{-3.12}*** 
[-6.21]*** 
    -0.023 
(-4.18)*** 
{-2.96}*** 
[-6.43]*** 
    0.005 
   (1.49) 
   {1.05} 
   [2.63]*** 
    -0.014 
(-3.29)*** 
{2.33}** 
 [-3.55]*** 
       
Total 
Number of 
firms 
66 66 66 66 66 66 
       
Number of 
firms with 
a negative 
three-day 
CAR 
48 
{{0.000}} 
48 
{{0.000}} 
54 
{{0.000}} 
50 
{{0.000}} 
26 
{{0.968}} 
46 
{{0.001}} 
       
 
Panel B. Anti-CNOOC-takeover events for Oil Refining Firms 
 6/20/05 6/27/05 7/13/05 7/14/05 7/21/05 7/27/05 
Average 
three-day 
CAR 
   -0.026 
(-5.58)*** 
{-3.95}*** 
[-5.19]*** 
   -0.026 
(-5.05)*** 
{-3.57}*** 
[-5.04]*** 
     -0.024 
(-1.99)* 
{-1.41} 
  [-2.32]** 
     -0.018 
 (-2.45)** 
{-1.73}* 
   [-3.24]*** 
    -0.016 
 (-2.66)** 
{-1.88}* 
 [-2.57]** 
   -0.022 
(-4.32)*** 
{-3.05}*** 
[-5.06]*** 
       
Total 
Number of 
firms 
13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Number of 
firms with 
a negative 
three-day 
CAR 
12 
{{0.002}} 
12 
{{0.002}} 
11 
{{0.011}} 
12 
{{0.002}} 
11 
{{0.011}} 
11 
{{0.011}} 
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TABLE 4.  Cross-Sectional Tests to Correct for Event-induced Variance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Average one-day CAR of the Six anti-CNOOC-takeover events taken altogether 
 Oil and Gas Exploration Firms 
 
Oil Refining Firms 
 
Average 
one-day 
CAR 
                        -0.010 
(-8.65)*** 
{-6.12}*** 
[-11.38]*** 
                                  -0.007 
(-4.24)*** 
{-3.00}*** 
[-4.98]*** 
   
Total 
Number of 
firms 
66 13 
   
Number of 
firms with 
a negative 
one-day 
CAR 
60 
{{0.000}} 
12 
{{0.002}} 
   
 
Panel D. Average three-day CAR of the Six anti-CNOOC-takeover events taken altogether 
 Oil and Gas Exploration Firms 
 
Oil Refining Firms 
 
Average 
three-day 
CAR 
                        -0.012 
(-5.07)*** 
{-3.59}*** 
[-6.98]*** 
                                  -0.020 
(-5.93)*** 
{-4.19}*** 
[-7.97]*** 
   
Total 
Number of 
firms 
66 13 
   
Number of 
firms with 
a negative 
three-day 
CAR 
56 
{{0.000}} 
13 
{{0.000}} 
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 TABLE 5.  Takeover Premiums of Three Mega Mergers of Oil Firms in 1998−1999 
 
This table presents the takeover premiums in dollar and in percentage terms paid for 
merging Amoco and BP, Mobil and Exxon, and ARCO and BP-Amoco during the 
merger wave of oil companies in 1998−1999.   
 
Announcement 
Date 
Acquiring 
Firm 
Target 
Firm 
Value of 
Takeover 
Offer 
($billion) 
Market Value of 
Target Firma  
($billion)  
Takeover 
Premiumb  
($billion) 
[%] 
 
8/11/1998 
 
BP 
 
Amoco 
 
$48.17  
 
$39.46 
 
$8.71 
[22.07%] 
 
12/1/1998 Exxon Mobil $78.95 $58.39 $20.56 
[35.21%] 
 
4/1/1999 BP-Amoco ARCO $27.22 $17.31 $9.91 
[57.25%] 
      
Mean   $51.45 $38.30 $13.06 
[38.18%] 
 
Total   $154.34 $115.16 $39.18 
 
      
Source: The Thomson Financial SDC Database. 
a
 The market value of the target firm is calculated by multiplying the closing price and shares 
outstanding of the target firm four weeks prior to the announcement date. 
b
 Takeover premium is computed based on the deal value as a percentage of the target’s market 
value four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal. 
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TABLE 6.  Cross-border M&A of US Targets  
 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regression of cross-border ratio using the difference-in-difference 
methodology.  Dty  denotes the difference in cross-border ratio between the US oil industry and the US 
chemical industry in quarter t; cross-border ratio is measured by either number or deal value of M&A, 
cross-border ratio measured by number (deal value) of M&A is computed by dividing the number (deal 
value) of cross-border M&A by the aggregate number (deal value) of domestic and cross-border M&A 
during the quarter; TIME is a linear time trend variable; D1 takes the value of one if the calendar quarter is 
either 2005Q2 or 2005Q3 and zero if otherwise; D2 takes the value of one if the calendar quarter is after 
2005Q3 and zero if otherwise; WMKTt is a simple average of the ratio of daily MSCI World Index 
(excluding US index) to daily MSCI US Index during quarter t.  EXRATEt is defined as a simple average of 
the daily weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the US dollar against a subset of the broad 
index currencies in quarter t; OILPRIt is defined as the simple average of the daily price of the West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil during quarter t.  WMKTt, EXRATEt, and OILPRIt are transformed by taking their 
first and second differences in time, i.e. 1t t tx x x −∆ = − and 1 1 2t t tx x x− − −∆ = − .   
 
The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses.  Statistical significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) 
and 10% (‘*’) levels. 
 Number of M&A 
 
Deal Value of M&A 
D1 -0.375*** 
(-3.07) 
 -0.760*** 
(-4.71) 
D2 -0.261*** 
(-3.16) 
 -0.675*** 
(-6.06) 
TIME 0.0086 
(1.68) 
 0.0159** 
(2.3) 
∆WMKTt 1.1037 
(1.03) 
 3.3084** 
(2.43) 
∆WMKTt-1 1.9098 
(1.62) 
 3.7929** 
(2.65) 
∆EXRATEt 0.0134 
(1.05) 
 0.0003 
(0.02) 
∆EXRATEt-1 0.0361** 
(2.54) 
 0.0537*** 
(3.42) 
∆OILPRIt -0.009 
(-1.33) 
 -0.032*** 
(-3.34) 
∆OILPRIt-1 -0.001 
(-0.12) 
 -0.011 
(-1.11) 
Intercept -0.684* 
(-2.04) 
 -1.125** 
(-2.49) 
AR(1) 0.5935*** 
(2.97) 
 0.2862 
(1.71) 
AR(2) 0.5447** 
(2.79) 
 0.4691*** 
(3.64) 
AR(3) 0.6058*** 
(3.05) 
 0.7272*** 
(4.46) 
R2 0.22  0.75 
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TABLE 7.  Robustness check (Event Classification) 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the multifactor pricing model over the three-day window (day −1 
to day +1) for (i) non-overlapping anti-CNOOC-takeover events in Panel A and (ii) the expanded anti-
CNOOC-takeover events where ambiguous events are treated as anti-CNOOC-takeover events in Panel B 
of an equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal) and an equal-
weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms (excluding Chevron).  Denote Dk,t the binary variable that 
takes one during the three-day period around a given event date, t*, and zero otherwise.  For each of the 
event dates (i.e., t*), the 3-day cumulative residual returns are computed by summing the coefficients γi,k of 
industry i over k = [−1,+1] by using the multifactor pricing model: 
 
1
, ,
1
it i oi ot mi mt fi ft i k k t it
k
R R R R Dα β β β γ ε+
=−
= + + + + +∑   
The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses, based on the robust standard errors.  Statistical 
significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) and 10% (‘*’) levels. 
 
 
Panel A.  Anti-CNOOC-takeover events (excluding 14 July 2005) 
 
αi βo βm βf γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration 
industry 0.000 0.094*** 0.457*** 0.809*** 0.000 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.011* 0.813 
 (0.739) (5.017) (5.662) (16.227) (-0.043) (-3.911) (-0.456) (-1.913)  
          
Oil refining industry 0.001 0.154*** 0.730*** 0.745*** -0.006*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.019** 0.588 
 (1.482) (3.151) (5.259) (8.454) (-7.136) (-1.249) (-1.153) (-2.453)  
          
 
Panel B.  Expanded Anti-CNOOC-takeover events (including ambiguous events) 
 
αi βo βm βf γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration 
industry 0.000 0.091*** 0.442*** 0.820*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.006* 0.817 
 (0.656) (4.864) (5.555) (16.643) (0.113) (-3.801) (0.772) (-1.786)  
          
Oil refining industry 0.001 0.153*** 0.719*** 0.747*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011** 0.586 
 (1.435) (3.132) (5.176) (8.454) (-1.375) (-1.517) (-0.696) (-2.157)  
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TABLE 8.  Robustness check (Alternative Methodology) 
 
This table presents the OLS regression of the difference in the average daily abnormal return between the 
US and foreign oil stocks in their respective industries (oil refining vs. oil and gas exploration) over the 
three-day window (day −1 to day +1) for the two types of takeover events:  (i) Anti-CNOOC-takeover and 
(ii) ambiguous events.  Denote tdεˆ  the difference in the average daily abnormal return between the US 
non-merging and foreign oil stocks in their respective industries on day t and Dk,t the binary variable that 
takes one during the three-day period around a given event date, t*, and zero otherwise.  For a given oil 
industry, the 3-day cumulative residual returns are computed by summing the coefficients γk over k = 
[−1,+1] by using the following regression model: 
1
,
1
ˆt k k t t
k
d D vε α γ
+
=−
= + +∑  
The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses, based on the robust standard errors.  Statistical 
significance is marked, at 1% (‘***’), 5% (‘**’) and 10% (‘*’) levels. 
 
 
Panel A.  Anti-CNOOC-takeover events 
 
αi γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration industry 0.000 0.000 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.051 
 (0.511) (0.451) (-0.113) (0.511) (-2.912)  
       
Oil refining industry 0.000 -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.014** 0.013 
 (0.448) (-0.869) (-2.832) (0.448) (-2.464)  
 
Panel B.  Ambiguous events 
 αi γi,−1 γi,0 γi,+1 Σγi,k R2 
Oil and gas exploration industry 0.000 -0.006 -0.004*** 0.016*** 0.005 0.026 
 (0.051) (40.541) (-1.473) (0.051) (1.183)  
       
Oil refining industry 0.000 0.001 -0.010** 0.006*** -0.003 0.008 
 (0.070) (10.527) (0.565) (0.070) (-0.497)  
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Figure 1.  Cumulative residual returns plot 
 
This figure plots the cumulative residual returns of an equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US 
oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal, solid diamond), and an equal-weighted 
portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms (excluding Chevron, solid square) in the sample.   
The cumulative residual returns are from day -3 to day 3 around the event date.   
 
A. Anti-CNOOC-takeover events 
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Figure 2. Cross-border Ratio in US Oil and Chemical Industries: 2000Q1−2007Q4 
 
Panel A. Cross-border Ratio Measured by Number of M&A 
 
Panel B. Cross-border Ratio Measured by Deal Value of M&A 
 
The first anti-CNOOC-
takeover event began 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative residual returns during the political opposition window 
 
This figure plots the cumulative residual returns from June 20 to August 2, 2005, of an 
equal-weighted portfolio of 66 US oil and gas exploration firms (excluding Unocal), 
dashed line below, and an equal-weighted portfolio of 13 US oil refining firms (excluding 
Chevron), solid line.  The cumulative residual returns are cumulative sums of the 
coefficients of a series of dummy variables for each date from June 20 to August 2, in the 
multifactor pricing model: 
8/2
, ,
6/20
it i oi ot mi mt fi ft i k k t it
k
R R R R Dα β β β γ ε
=
= + + + + +∑  
where Dk,t is a binary variable that takes one during the period from June 20 to August 2, 
2005, and zero otherwise.  The cumulative residual returns at a day t are the sum of γi,k 
from k=6/20 up to day t. 
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Appendix I.  Recent Cross-border Acquisitions by CNOOC 
 
This table lists major acquisitions by CNOOC from 2002 to 2006, in reverse 
chronological order.  The acquisition events are taken from the press releases and 
CNOOC’s annual reports posted on its website:  http://www.CNOOCltd.com. 
 
Date Country Description 
April 20, 2006 Nigeria CNOOC acquired a 45% working interest in an offshore oil mining 
license in Nigeria from South Atlantic Petroleum Limited 
(‘SAPETRO’) (approx. US$2.268 billion).  
April 8, 2006 Canada CNOOC signed an agreement with a Canada-based company, MEG 
Energy Corp, to acquire a 16.69% stake in MEG (approx. 150 
million Canadian dollars). 
April 3, 2006 Australia CNOOC signed farm-in agreements with BHP Billiton and Kerr-
McGee for exploration permits in the Outer Browse Basin of 
Australia.  
January 27, 2006 Nigeria CNOOC acquired a 35% working interest in a contract for an oil 
prospecting license in Nigeria (approx. US$60 million). 
February 21, 2005 Morocco CNOOC signed a joint study agreement with Office National de 
Recherches et d’Exploitations Pétrolières (‘ONAREP’), a Moroccan 
national oil company, to assess the oil potential in the basins of 
Haha and Missour, Morocco. 
January 25, 2005 Myanmar Jointly with Singaporean Golden Aaron Pte Limited and the PRC-
based HQCEC, CNOOC signed production sharing contracts with 
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (‘MOGE’). 
December 18, 2004 Australia CNOOC acquired an approximately 5.3% interest in certain 
production licenses, retention leases and an exploration permit of 
the NWS Gas Project, and a right to participate in future exploration 
undertaken over and above the proven reserves. (approx. US$528 
million). 
May 13, 2004 Indonesia CNOOC acquired an additional 20.767% interest in the Muturi 
production sharing contract from BG Group (approx. US$105.1 
million). 
April 2004 Morocco CNOOC acquired from Vanco Energy Corporation an 11.25% 
interest in a petroleum agreement for Ras Tafelney in offshore 
Morocco   (approx. US$7.75 million). 
March 7, 2003 Kazakhstan CNOOC acquired from BG an 8.33% interest in the North Caspian 
Sea Project in Kazakhstan (approx. US$615 million). 
February 4, 2003 Indonesia CNOOC acquired from BP an equivalent 12.5% stake in the 
Tangguh LNG project (US$275 million). 
April 19, 2002 Indonesia CNOOC acquired nine Repsol YPF S.A. subsidiaries owning 
working interests in five oil and gas properties in Indonesia 
(US$585 million). 
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APPENDIX II.  Details of sample US oil and gas companies  
 
PERMNO and TICKER are the CRSP-specific permanent number and ticker symbol for 
the securities.  The shares outstanding and market capitalization of the securities are 
measured by the closing price and shares outstanding as of June 1, 2005. 
 
PERMNO TICKER Company name 
Shares 
outstanding 
(million) 
Market 
capitalization 
($million) 
88888 CEO  C N O O C LTD  8.50# 467.24# 
14541 CVX  CHEVRON CORP NEW  2,098.22 114,877.55 
14891 UCL  UNOCAL CORP  271.78 15,700.85 
     
Industry: Oil and Gas Exploration (SIC=1311) 
 
88906 ATPG  A T P OIL & GAS CORP  28.97 622.48 
76888 ABP  ABRAXAS PETROLEUM CORP  37.89 104.19 
70332 APC  ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP  235.71 18,152.10 
39490 APA  APACHE CORP  328.19 19,645.39 
89727 ARD  ARENA RESOURCES INC  10.33 115.72 
90180 ATLS  ATLAS AMERICA INC  13.33 423.19 
76240 BJS  B J SERVICES CO  161.92 8,252.86 
42358 BRN  BARNWELL INDUSTRIES INC  2.72 170.92 
11478 BRY  BERRY PETROLEUM CO  21.17 1,063.54 
90494 BBG  BILL BARRETT CORP  43.39 1,350.20 
89948 CKX  C K X LANDS INC  1.94 23.31 
76082 COG  CABOT OIL & GAS CORP  48.92 1,630.11 
84723 LNG  CHENIERE ENERGY INC  53.75 1,613.42 
78877 CHK  CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP  315.23 6,553.63 
89509 XEC  CIMAREX ENERGY CO  41.78 1,607.51 
11644 CRK  COMSTOCK RESOURCES INC  40.72 976.82 
88871 MCF  CONTANGO OIL AND GAS COMPANY  13.21 103.15 
27677 CRED  CREDO PETROLEUM CORP  6.04 93.08 
90017 XTXI  CROSSTEX ENERGY INC  12.76 578.67 
82196 DNR  DENBURY RESOURCES INC  56.76 1,834.52 
87137 DVN  DEVON ENERGY CORP NEW  471.68 22,145.38 
88922 EAC  ENCORE ACQUISTION CO  32.87 1,242.78 
90204 END  ENDEAVOUR INTERNATIONAL CORP  74.22 250.13 
88817 EPL  ENERGY PARTNERS LTD  37.53 870.39 
75825 EOG  EOG RESOURCES INC  239.25 12,342.86 
37234 FST  FOREST OIL CORP  60.64 2,451.72 
88945 GMXR  G M X RESOURCES  8.20 99.33 
38755 GEOI  GEORESOURCES INC  3.73 44.53 
57509 GDP  GOODRICH PETROLEUM CORP  24.25 427.77 
63562 GW  GREY WOLF INC  190.86 1,250.13 
40970 HEC  HARKEN ENERGY CORP  219.07 98.58 
75734 HNR  HARVEST NATURAL RESOURCES INC  37.64 414.41 
32707 HP  HELMERICH & PAYNE INC  51.19 2,125.75 
83991 THX  HOUSTON EXPLORATION CO  28.67 1,479.45 
11887 KCS  K C S ENERGY INC  49.82 722.34 
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89790 MPET  MAGELLAN PETROLEUM CORP  25.78 33.00 
80557 MMR  MCMORAN EXPLORATION CO  24.63 460.60 
68742 TMR  MERIDIAN RESOURCE CORP  86.59 403.52 
89857 MXC  MEXCO ENERGY CORP  1.73 14.75 
79915 NFX  NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO  126.40 4,964.91 
34833 OXY  OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP  398.25 29,793.23 
87467 PYR  P Y R ENERGY CORP  31.57 42.62 
61218 PLLL  PARALLEL PETROLEUM CORP DE  31.19 223.00 
58675 PKD  PARKER DRILLING CO  95.74 562.93 
61955 PVA  PENN VIRGINIA CORP  18.71 788.44 
75241 PXD  PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO  143.99 5,876.07 
89636 PXP  PLAINS EXPLORATION & PROD CO  77.40 2,492.28 
46923 PNRG  PRIMEENERGY CORP  3.39 72.27 
86759 KWK  QUICKSILVER RESOURCES INC  50.54 2,752.80 
50017 RRC  RANGE RESOURCES CORP  81.60 2,002.46 
77555 REM  REMINGTON OIL & GAS CORP  28.49 897.85 
66617 REXI  RESOURCE AMERICA INC  17.67 608.94 
63765 SWN  SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY CO  36.46 2,628.62 
87254 SKE  SPINNAKER EXPLORATION CO  34.00 1,057.62 
78170 SM  ST MARY LAND & EXPLORATION CO  57.24 1,530.00 
79444 SGY  STONE ENERGY CORP  26.87 1,192.40 
66739 SFY  SWIFT ENERGY CO  28.33 994.77 
87471 TGC  TENGASCO INC  48.76 10.73 
76340 TPY  TIPPERARY CORP  41.37 193.59 
63781 UNT  UNIT CORP  45.86 1,830.65 
76272 VPI  VINTAGE PETROLEUM INC  66.79 1,893.38 
90492 WRES  WARREN RESOURCES INC  35.57 313.02 
75888 WGR  WESTERN GAS RESOURCES INC  74.23 2,485.83 
89901 WLL  WHITING PETROLEUM CORP  29.79 1,041.23 
38172 WOC  WILSHIRE ENTERPRISES INC  7.88 59.06 
79212 XTO  X T O ENERGY INC  360.94 11,470.58 
     
Industry: Oil Refining (SIC=2911) 
 
28484 AHC  AMERADA HESS CORP  92.32 8,809.91 
13928 COP  CONOCOPHILLIPS  696.15 76,680.92 
11850 XOM  EXXON MOBIL CORP  6,365.74 363,801.76 
56063 FTO  FRONTIER OIL CORP  27.40 1,389.73 
32803 HOC  HOLLY CORP  31.77 1,235.69 
25769 KMG  KERR MCGEE CORP  115.10 8,522.00 
75444 LYO  LYONDELL CHEMICAL CO  246.07 6,008.91 
15069 MRO  MARATHON OIL CORP  347.86 17,257.33 
28345 MUR  MURPHY OIL CORP  92.22 9,190.15 
89374 PCO  PREMCOR INC  89.22 6,164.14 
14656 SUN  SUNOCO INC  68.84 7,276.18 
37284 TSO  TESORO CORP  68.06 3,044.19 
85269 VLO  VALERO ENERGY CORP NEW  256.73 18,305.06 
#
 This figure does not include shares issued outside the US stock markets. 
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APPENDIX III:  Details of sample oil and gas ADRs 
 
PERMNO and TICKER are the CRSP-specific permanent number and ticker symbol of 
the ADRs.  The shares outstanding are the total shares listed in the US stock markets in 
the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) as of June 1, 2005.  The market 
capitalization is computed by multiplying the closing price with shares outstanding of the 
ADR as of June 1, 2005. 
 
 
PERMNO TICKER Company name 
Shares 
outstanding 
(million)# 
Market 
capitalization 
($million)# 
Industry: Oil and Gas Exploration (SIC=1311) 
 
88391 CNQ  CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LTD  536.66 16,067.88 
89507 SNG  CANADIAN SUPERIOR ENERGY INC  109.87 187.87 
82196 DNR  DENBURY RESOURCES INC  56.76 1,834.52 
89134 ECA  ENCANA CORP  882.50 31,258.18 
88869 EENC  ENTERRA ENERGY CORP  25.43 496.57 
33099 IMO  IMPERIAL OIL LTD  345.89 24,775.88 
90339 IOC  INTEROIL CORP  28.88 742.24 
88537 IVAN  IVANHOE ENERGY INC  199.91 437.81 
90113 JDO  J E D OIL INC  9.52 169.40 
30277 NXY  NEXEN INC  260.21 6,994.36 
87540 PZE  PETROBRAS ENERGIA PARTICIPAC S A  26.56 331.17 
87844 PTR  PETROCHINA CO LTD  27.74 1,806.28 
85552 PKZ  PETROKAZAKHSTAN INC  74.60 2,138.67 
88490 PBR  PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA PETROBRAS  174.40 8,344.57 
75632 REP  REPSOL YPF S A  35.12 882.09 
25267 RD  ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO  516.08 30,128.52 
68815 STOSY  SANTOS LIMITED  2.71 84.78 
89016 STO  STATOIL A S A  40.52 729.36 
80070 SU  SUNCOR ENERGY INC  455.94 18,219.20 
85635 TLM  TALISMAN ENERGY INC  367.23 12,331.62 
77078 TOT  TOTAL S A  86.73 9,711.47 
88882 UPL  ULTRA PETROLEUM CORP  152.87 4,144.25 
79362 YPF  Y P F SOCIEDAD ANONIMA  224.03 11,750.48 
     
Industry: Oil Refining (SIC=2911) 
 
85898 TNT  AO TATNEFT  24.61 859.84 
29890 BP  B P PLC  1,169.91 71,446.40 
88660 SNP  CHINA PETRO & CHEMICAL CORP  21.42 766.48 
85446 EON  E ON AG  38.93 1,128.49 
69606 NHY  NORSK HYDRO A S  9.17 756.44 
82232 PCZ  PETRO CANADA  259.84 14,808.40 
#
 This figure does not include shares issued outside the US stock markets. 
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APPENDIX IV:  Details of Cross-Sectional Tests 
 
Throughout this appendix we use the following notations: 
N = number of individual firms, 
Rit = security i’s return on day t, 
Rot = crude oil price return on day t, 
Rft 
 
= return on an equally weighted portfolio of ADRs that have the same SIC 
code as security i on day t, 
Ait 
 
= security i’s residual return on day t, 
 
1
1
it
t
A
+
=−
∑  = security i’s cumulative three-day residual return surrounding the event day, 
 
SRiE 
 
= security i’s standardized residual returns on the event day,  
= AiE / forecast standard error of security i on the event day,16   
1
1
it
t
SR
+
=−
∑  
 
= security i’s cumulative three-day standardized residual return surrounding the 
event day, 
 
For each US oil firm in our sample, we apply the standard event-study 
methodology, as described in Boehmer et al. (1991).  Using data in the estimation 
window (120 days prior to the day before the first anti-CNOOC-takeover event),17 for 
each firm, we run a regression based on the following multifactor pricing model:  
                                                 
16
 To simply notations, we drop the index for security i in the following discussion.   Let Xt be a column 
vector (K×1) consisting of 1, Rot, Rmt and Rft; X be a T×K matrix consisting of T rows of the transpose of 
Xt in the estimation window.  The forecast standard error of AE, i.e. the residual return on the event date, is 
Var(AE)=s2[1+XE(X’X)-1XE], where s2 = ∑t=1T At2/(T-4).  DeSalvo (1971) provides a discussion about the 
forecast standard error in multiple regression framework (as in our multifactor pricing model). 
17
 We check the robustness of our results with respect to the length of estimation window.  The results 
based on estimation window of 90 days and 150 days prior to the first anti-CNOOC-takeover event remain 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those based on the 120-day estimation window.  
 60
Rit = αi + βoiRot + βmiRmt + βfiRft + εit. 
Next, for each firm, we compute its one-day residual return (i.e. Ait =  Rit  - ( ˆiα  + ˆoiβ Rot + 
ˆ
miβ Rmt + ˆ fiβ Rft), its cumulative three-day residual return (i.e. 
1
1
it
t
A
+
=−
∑ ), and their 
corresponding forecast standard errors around each of the six anti-CNOOC-takeover 
event date.  Three tests are then performed.  
(1) The Ordinary Cross-sectional Test 
This test uses the cross-sectional standard deviation estimated during the event 
period for its t-test.  The resulting t-statistics for the one-day residual return is 
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(2) The Standardized Cross-sectional Test 
The t-statistics for the one-day residual return is 
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(3) Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
 
The Wilcoxon signed rank statistic W+ for the one-day residual return is computed 
by ordering the absolute values |A1E|, |A2E|, …, |ANE|, the rank of each ordered |AiE| is 
given a rank of Ranki.  Denote iϕ ≡I(AiE >0), where I(.) is an indicator function.  The 
Wilcoxon signed ranked statistic W+ is defined as 
1
N
i i
i
W Rankϕ+
=
=∑  
Similarly, to compute the Wilcoxon signed rank statistic W+ for the cumulative 
three-day residual return, for each firm, we replace AiE by 
1
1
it
t
A
+
=−
∑  in the above procedure. 
 
